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A B S T R A C T
The popularity of Twitter for information discovery, coupled with the automatic shortening of
URLs to save space, given the 140 character limit, provides cybercriminals with an opportunity to
obfuscate the URL of a malicious Web page within a tweet. Once the URL is obfuscated, the
cybercriminal can lure a user to click on it with enticing text and images before carrying out a
cyber attack using a malicious Web server. This is known as a drive-by download. In a drive-by
download a user's computer system is infected while interacting with the malicious endpoint,
often without them being made aware the attack has taken place. An attacker can gain control of
the system by exploiting unpatched system vulnerabilities and this form of attack currently re-
presents one of the most common methods employed. In this paper we build a machine learning
model using machine activity data and tweet metadata to move beyond post-execution classiﬁ-
cation of such URLs as malicious, to predict a URL will be malicious with 0.99 F-measure (using
10-fold cross-validation) and 0.833 (using an unseen test set) at 1 s into the interaction with the
URL. Thus, providing a basis from which to kill the connection to the server before an attack has
completed and proactively blocking and preventing an attack, rather than reacting and repairing
at a later date.
1. Introduction
Online social networks (OSNs) have emerged as powerful tools for disseminating information. Among these, Twitter, a micro-
blogging website that allows its users to express themselves in 140 characters, has emerged as a go-to source for current aﬀairs,
entertainment news and to seek information about global events in real-time. For example, Twitter has been used to study public
reaction to events such as natural disasters (Sakaki, Okazaki, & Matsuo, 2010), political elections (Tumasjan, Sprenger, Sandner, &
Welpe, 2010) and terrorist attacks (Burnap et al., 2014). The England versus Iceland football match at the European Football
Championships (Euro 2016) was one of the most tweeted about events of 2016 attracting 2.1 million users (Rogers, 2016). This high
volume of users around a popular trending event and Twitter's inbuilt feature of shortening a URL due to its 140 character restriction
provides cybercriminals with an opportunity to obfuscate links to malicious Web pages within tweets and carry out a drive-by
download attack. In a drive-by download (Cova, Kruegel, & Vigna, 2010; Moshchuk, Bragin, Gribble, & Levy, 2006) an attacker
attempts to lure users to malicious Web pages so that they can hijack the user's system by exploiting a system vulnerability. By
successfully carrying out these attacks an attacker is able to, for example, obtain remote access, steal user information, or make the
computer part of a botnet (Provos, McNamee, Mavrommatis, Wang, & Modadugu, 2007).
The more popular OSNs become, the more attractive a platform they become for cybercriminals to conduct their attacks
(ZeroFox, 2017). Microsoft acknowledged this fast growing threat of malicious Web pages as one the top threats in their security and
intelligence report published in 2013 (Microsoft, 2013) and the detection of drive-by download attacks remains an important topic of
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research. The problem of detecting these drive-by download attacks on Twitter has been broadly investigated from a number of
perspectives including: (i) characteristics of OSN user accounts (e.g. posting behaviours (Cao & Caverlee, 2015) and social network
links (Yang, Harkreader, & Gu, 2011)); (ii) characteristics of URLs (e.g. lexical features (Ma, Saul, Savage, & Voelker, 2009) and
endpoint activity (Lee & Kim, 2013; Lee & Stokes, 2011)); and (iii) analysing the code of a Web page in a static or dynamic manner to
study its intended or actual behaviour when interacting with the underlying system on which the OSN user is accessing the Web page.
In our earlier work we recorded system-level machine activity for ﬁve minutes to capture behavioural interactions with Web
servers (Burnap, Javed, Rana, & Awan, 2015). This was used to build a machine classiﬁer that was able to distinguish between
malicious and benign URLs with an F-measure of 0.72 when we tested the model on an unseen dataset. The main contribution in our
previous work was to build a machine classiﬁer to classify a URL at the end of a 5 minute interaction.
In this paper we extend our previous work by adding more behavioural features to improve classiﬁer performance and reducing
the classiﬁcation period to 10 s to predict a drive-by download attack based on early-stage machine activities observed before the attack is
complete. By capturing machine activity metrics (e.g. CPU use, RAM use, Network I/O for full list see Appendix A) and tweet at-
tributes, we are now able to predict whether the URL is pointing to a malicious Web page with 0.99 F-measure (using 10-fold cross
validation) and 0.833 F-measure (using an unseen test set) at 1 s into the interaction with a URL. This provides a novel contribution
with which it is possible to kill the connection to the server before an attack has completed - thus proactively blocking and preventing
an attack, rather than reacting and repairing at a later date. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study to proactively predict
a drive-by download attack by classifying a URL during interaction, rather than requiring the malicious payload to complete before
classiﬁcation.
2. Related work
Twitter has been used to carry out a broad range of cyber attacks. For instance, in 2015 the US Pentagon's email servers were
targeted by Russian hackers using Twitter (Robinson, 2015).
Cybercriminals have targeted popular people who have a large number of followers to propagate malware or spam by hacking
their accounts, for instance, Twitter's CFO Anthony Noto (Berkowitz, 2015) and former Apple Macintosh evangelist Guy Kawasaki
(McMillan, 2009). In a survey conducted by SANS Institute to identify the most frequent methods employed by cybercriminals to
launch cyber attacks on organisations, it was shown that drive-by downloads accounted for 48% of attacks by exploiting Web-based
vulnerabilities (SANS Institue, 2017). Such cyber attacks could also be used as an entry point to carry out more wide-spreading
attacks such as Ransomware for instance, a Crypto Locker attack that originated from a drive-by download attack locked down a
small city in Washington, USA for four days (Kumar, 2017).
In this section, we discuss the related work on the topic of detecting malicious content in Online Social Networks (OSN). This is
presented in two sub-sections - we ﬁrst look at detecting such content using OSN user account and URL characteristics, and then study
the use of static and dynamic code analysis. Using tweet meta-data Kristina and Rumi followed various top stories and used various
tweet attributes to demonstrate how rapidly information (e.g. malicious URLs) can be disseminated in Twitter (Lerman &
Ghosh, 2010), making it the core focus for existing work in this area - so the majority of the related work focuses on Twitter and tweet
meta-data. It should be noted though that malicious URLs and spam are a signiﬁcant issue on all OSNs. Twitter is very active for
breaking-news and real-world events, hence it provides an environment that is particularly attractive to cybercriminals - but all OSNs
include the sharing of hyperlinks so are susceptible to these issues. Table 1 provides a summary of related work and the methods used
at a high level for comparison.
2.1. Detecting malicious content based on OSN account and URL characteristics
Previous research has aimed to identify tweets that are classiﬁed as spam or contain a URL pointing to a malicious Web server
based on tweet meta-data. The rationale being that it is possible to diﬀerentiate between a ’normal’ user and that of a cybercriminal
based on user account characteristics extracted from meta-data such as the number of followers, number of people they follow, their
posting behaviour etc. This research identiﬁed tweet attributes can be used to detect accounts that exhibit abnormal behaviour (e.g.
posting spam or malicious URLs). Cao and Caverlee analysed the behaviour of Twitter users to detect tweets classiﬁed as spam, using
meta-data from the user account posting the spam or URL, as well as the user account clicking the URL (Cao & Caverlee, 2015). Their
hypothesis was based on the assumption that it is diﬃcult to manipulate such behavioural signals. Chen, Zhang, Xiang, Zhou, and
Oliver (2016) used a Finite State Machine based spam template, demonstrating that a cybercriminal can create 2000 tweets from a
single template. They discovered that such users were using multiple accounts to post spam in a coordinated manner to avoid
detection.
They were exhibiting “load balancing” - a technique frequently used to prevent denial of service attacks - but in this case, posting
from multiple accounts to prevent being detected. Stringhini et al. created honey-proﬁles on the top three OSNs and recorded the
content and interactions made to these proﬁles to identify tweet attributes contributing to malware propagation (Stringhini, Kruegel,
& Vigna, 2010). Benevenuto et al. focused on identifying spam centred around Twitter using twenty three tweet attributes
(Benevenuto, Magno, Rodrigues, & Almeida, 2010). Grier et al. analysed spam behaviour and the eﬀectiveness of using a blacklist of
URLs to detect spam on Twitter (Grier, Thomas, Paxson, & Zhang, 2010). Yang et al. (2011) used features based on timing and
automation to detect spam on Twitter. Their research was focused on social network relationships such as betweenness centrality and
bidirectional link ratio between spam nodes and their neighbouring nodes. The same authors collaborated with Yang, Harkreader,
Zhang, Shin, and Gu (2012) to analyse the cybercriminal ecosystem on Twitter studying inner and outer social relationships. The
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inner social relationship hypothesised that criminal accounts are interconnected. The outer social relationship experiment high-
lighted that accounts that follow and support criminal accounts are well hidden in the network. Similarly, a feature based approach
was employed by Cresci, Di Pietro, Petrocchi, Spognardi, and Tesconi (2015) by building a classiﬁer to detect fake accounts created
by cybercriminals to inﬂate the number of followers. To date, the research has been focused on studying OSN accounts and URL
characteristics to identify those tweets or accounts that are exhibiting deviant behaviour (posting spam or malicious URLs). Providing
evidence that OSN accounts or URLs may be malicious can be beneﬁcial but given the frequency and volume at which new accounts
emerge, the only way to determine actual malicious behaviour is occurring is to observe it. Once malicious activity occurs it is
currently not possible to ﬂag it and stop it. None of the methods published to date allows us to observe malicious activity and block it
to minimise the damage. Thus we propose to build on the existing literature that uses characteristics as features and include them in a
predictive model that will incorporate tweet attributes to predict that the URL is likely to perform malicious activity during the early
stages of interaction, providing a novel enhancement to the research ﬁeld whereby we can observe malicious behaviour, including
that of newly created accounts with limited account history, and block it before maximum damage occurs.
2.2. Detecting malicious content by analysing the static or dynamic activity of a Web page
There are two ways to analyse the activity of a Web page. Static analysis looks at the code that drives the page, looking for
recognised malicious code and methods. Dynamic analysis executes the code by interacting with the Web page and observes the
behaviour on the endpoint and the local system, also looking for evidence of known malicious activity. Static analysis: McGrath and
Gupta analysed the anatomy of phishing URLs, studying the patterns of characters and domain length in URLs to develop a ﬁlter to
detect phishing URLs (McGrath & Gupta, 2008).
In a similar approach, an automated classiﬁcation model was built based on lexical and host-based features to detect malicious
URLs using statistical models (Ma et al., 2009). Canali et al. developed a ﬁlter called Prophiler (Canali, Cova, Vigna, & Kruegel, 2011)
that uses features derived from URLs and Web page code to determine whether a drive-by download will occur. In another approach
Kapravelos et al. compared similarities between various JavaScript programs to detect malicious Web pages (Kapravelos et al., 2013).
Dynamic analysis: A system was develop by Cova et al. to detect malicious Web pages in two stages (Cova et al., 2010). In the ﬁrst
stage various features such as URL redirects, length of dynamic code, number of dynamic executions etc. were used to detect an
anomaly. In the second part, they used a custom built browser to open the URL and record the events used to detect malicious
behaviour. Building on the principle of detecting malware by analysing dynamic execution of code, Kim et al. proposed a model to
systematically explore possible execution paths in order to reveal malicious behaviours (Kim et al., 2017). This is achieved by
analysing function parameters that could expose suspicious DOM injection and reveal malicious behaviour. In a similar approach,
Javasinghe et al. used the dynamic behaviour of a Web page to detect a drive-by download attack (Jayasinghe, Culpepper, & Bertok,
2014). Adobe Flash animations are a well-known entry point for Web-based attacks and these have been studied at various levels
during the interpreter loading, and execution process to detect malicious code (Wressnegger, Yamaguchi, Arp, & Rieck, 2016).
Research has also been undertaken to build a machine classiﬁer based on network activity to detect malware. In one approach Bartos
and Sofka looked at network traﬃc to build the classiﬁer from data captured in the form of proxy logs generated by 80 international
companies (Bartos, Sofka, & Franc, 2016). By doing so, they were able to detect both known as well as previously unseen security
threats based on network traﬃc. Similarly, Burnap et al. built a real-time classiﬁer speciﬁc to drive-by downloads originating from
Twitter based on network activity and machine activity (Burnap et al., 2014). Looking at the dynamic redirection of Web pages has
been proposed to detect phishing and spamming webpages in Lee and Kim (2013) and Lee and Stokes (2011). This was extended to
using forward and graph based features in Cao, Li, Ji, He, and Guo (2016).
In summary, while excellent results have been achieved by studying the static or dynamic activity of a Web page, the focus has
been on detection. As stated at the end of the previous section, to identify malicious activity in OSN it must be observed, and generally,
once it is observed, it is a problem that needs to be remedied. As with the research in the previous section, none of the research to date
that focuses on Web page activity has proposed a model capable of observing and potentially blocking malicious activity. Thus, in this
paper we focus on prediction, proposing a model that can classify a URL into malicious or benign based on OSN account attributes (as
per the previous section) and also dynamic machine behaviour - activity observed when the URL is clicked, and the Web page is being
loaded. The aim is to predict that behaviour observed in the early stages of loading a Web page is likely to lead to malicious activity at
a later stage - providing new capability for a user to block the completion of the malicious actions rather than depend on detection
and repair at a signiﬁcant cost and inconvenience.
3. Experimental setup
3.1. Data collection
We collected data on two popular sporting events. The rationale for choosing sporting events is that they attract a large number of
users, thus increasing the chances of a malicious link being clicked. For example in 2015 the Copa America recorded 14 billion
impressions alone (Laird, 2015) and the 2016 Rio Olympics was the top topic that year - surpassing even the US presidential election
(Kottasova, 2016).
For our experiments, we identiﬁed the European Football Championships (#Euro2016) and the Olympics (#Rio2016) in 2016.
Both generated some of the largest volumes of tweets in 2016 (Kottasova, 2016). Tweets containing a URL and hashtags relating to
these events were captured via the Twitter streaming API. The rationale behind selecting two events was to the determine whether
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our predictive model would generalise beyond a single event and be applicable for use on URLs posted around other events. For Euro
2016 we captured tweets from the period of 10 June to 14 July 2016 using the hashtag #Euro2016. We harvested 3,154,605 tweets
that contained a URL. During the opening ceremony that marked the opening of the Olympics in 2016 (the peak of public interest),
we captured 148,881 tweets that contained a URL using the hashtag #Rio2016. From the captured tweets we randomly created a
sample of 7500 unique tweets to identify 975 malicious URLs for European Football Championships dataset and, around 5000 tweets
were randomly chosen to identify around 525 unique malicious tweets for Olympics 2016 dataset by using a high interaction client
side honeypot.
High interaction honeypots perform dynamic analysis of interaction behaviour between a client machine and that of a Web server.
For our experimental results we used Capture HPC toolkit (Seifert, 2017). Capture HPC operates by visiting each URL that is passed to
it through a virtualised sandbox environment - interacting with the Web page for a pre-deﬁned amount of time. At the end of the
interaction period Capture HPC determines if any system-level operations have occurred including ﬁle, process and registry changes
made to the system. Based on these changes it classiﬁes the URL as malicious or benign (Puttaroo, Komisarczuk, & de Amorim, 2014).
The classiﬁcation is based on three exclusion lists (see Fig. 1) that are created based on known ﬁle, process or registry entries that are
targeted by drive-by download attacks. Fig. 1 gives a typical example of rules from a ﬁle exclusion list, where each positive symbol
indicates that system activity is allowed and a negative symbol means that it is not allowed and is ﬂagged as malicious. For example
any exe ﬁle that is written or created during the visitation of a Web page is not allowed. This exclusion list is updated every 14 days to
reﬂect the most recent actions that have been observed in drive-by download attacks. These exclusion lists are created by formalising
rules while visiting malicious or benign Web pages. A URL is classiﬁed as malicious if, while visiting the website, a system performs
certain activity or activities that violate the rules.
Capture HPC therefore gives us a label we can use for supervised learning and a set of activity logs we can use to train a system to
recognise the ’early warning signals’ that are present before the exclusion list ﬂag would have been raised. The reliance on Capture
HPC to provide us with a labelled data set for training our model is a limitation of our predictive model in that if the URL behaviour
varies beyond what has been previously ﬂagged as malicious, we will not obtain a malicious label for the URL. However, there are
millions of ﬂagged malicious URLs made available every day online for continuously updating Capture HPC's exclusion lists, so we
can mitigate this limitation with regular updates.
3.2. Architecture of the predictive model
The predictive model has three main components (see Fig. 2): feature extraction, persistent storage and machine learning. The main
function of feature extraction is to create a timeline of measurable observations on the client system based on machine activity and
tweet attributes from the time a URL is opened to the point at which a drive-by download is carried out, or the system becomes idle.
The feature extractor opens each URL that is passed to it in a sandbox environment and starts creating snapshots of machine activity
at time interval ’t’ for a period of ’p’. For our experiment, t = 1 s and the observation period is deﬁned as p= 10 s. The ﬁrst snapshot is
generated when a URL is ’clicked’ at t = 1 s, and then subsequently at an interval of t. Each snapshot is written to a database for
persistence as the sandbox environment is wiped clean after each URL has been visited. Each database insert includes (i) machine
activity and (ii) metadata of the tweet containing the URL. For machine activity, we log 54 metrics including network activity, ﬁle,
process, registry, RAM use, CPU usage (see Appendix A for a longer list and associated Pearson correlation scores with the malicious/
benign class). While recording machine activity we have deﬁned peak activities as the maximum number of activities observed while
visiting the Web site in the given 10-s window, and irregular activities are deﬁned by a set of activities that occur after a machine is
infected. These irregular activities are activities not observed while visiting a website as deﬁned in the exclusion list. We also use 24
pieces of metadata from the tweet, including username, user screen name, user id, follower count, friends count, and age of account
(see Appendix A for longer list). This produces 78 attributes every second for a period of p. During the training phase we know
whether the URL is malicious or benign based on the results from Capture HPC. This label is inserted into the database with each
snapshot. Once the observation time is complete, the sandbox environment is reset to a malware-free state so that each new URL can
be opened in a known malware free 230 conﬁguration with a consistent baseline.
The third component is the machine learning phase. For our predictive model we trained four diﬀerent machine algorithms to
determine the best method for class prediction using these data. We used the Weka toolkit to compare the predictive accuracy of (i)
generative models that consider conditional dependencies in the dataset (BayesNet) or assume conditional independence (Naive
Bayes), and (ii) discriminative models that aim to maximise information gain (J48 Decision Tree) and build multiple models to map
Fig. 1. File exclusion list.
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input to output via a number of connected nodes, even if the feature space is hard to linearly separate (Multi-layer Perceptron). To
test the models we used the feature extractor and the learned machine learning model from the training phase. Tweets from the
testing dataset (in the ﬁrst instance using 10-fold cross validation, and later using a holdout testing dataset) were passed into the
feature extractor, which opened the URL in the sandbox environment and created the machine activity and tweet meta-data snap-
shots at every time interval. Each snapshot was passed onto the learned model which classiﬁed the snapshot as malicious or benign. If
the result was ’benign’, the process continued to the next snapshot. The ﬁrst time the outcome was ’malicious’, the process stops and
the URL is classiﬁed as malicious, killing the connection to the Web page.
The framework is designed to be adaptive to an ever-changing environment by periodically updated the labelling method used to
train and test the classiﬁer so that new malware behaviour is reﬂected in the labels. This is achieved by periodically updating the
exclusion list of the honeypot. The exclusion list is updated once every 14 days by running URLs in CaptureHPC after executing them
in known malware labelling Web sites like Virustotal, which provide labels based on the leading commercial anti-virus tools. Based
on the machine activity observed in terms of ﬁles/process/registry we update the exclusion list (Puttaroo et al., 2014).
4. Results
4.1. Training on data from Euro 2016
To determine which models provide the best predictive power - not just overall classiﬁcation accuracy on all data - each model
was trained and tested using data from sequential, cumulative time intervals. That is, at each time interval t from t=1 to t= p where
p is the total number of time intervals (in this case p=10), each model was trained and tested using data from t = 1-to-p where
p= p+ 1. Each interval was evaluated with ten fold cross validation using the Weka toolkit. The results were calculated using
standard classiﬁcation metrics in which we deﬁne –
=
+
Precision TruePositive
TruePositive FalsePositive
=
+
Recall TruePositive
TruePositive FalseNegative
− =
+
F Measure 2. Precision. Recall
Precision Recall
We have also included False positive rate as one of metrics while testing our unseen dataset.
=
+
FalsePositiveRate FalsePositive
FalsePositive TrueNegative
Fig. 2. Architecture of predictive model.
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The results for each classiﬁer are presented in Fig. 3. In each sub-ﬁgure, the machine learning model is trained and tested on the
metrics derived using the Euro2016 data-set. Time in each table represents the time in seconds elapsed from the time the URL was
clicked, and the starting point is deﬁned as t=1. For example Time= 2 means 1 s has elapsed since the URL has been ’clicked’ (URL
clicked at t=1). Models built using the Naive Bayes and J48 algorithms (see Fig. 3a and c) exhibit similar behaviour - they both have
a dip in accuracy from the starting point and then it gradually continues to rise up. One explanation for this could be that during early
seconds there is a lack of system activity (see Fig. 4), leaving the algorithm struggling to diﬀerentiate between benign and malicious
activity. We deﬁne system activities as the range of activities happening while visiting a Web page. These include process running,
read/write operations happening on a ﬁle or registry entry, CPU usage etc. The F-measure of the J48 machine learning model follows
the trend of machine activity and continues to rise as more activity is recorded. When we compare the generative probabilistic models
(Naive Bayes and BayesNet) we ﬁnd that BayesNet outperforms Naive Bayes, suggesting interdependencies between attributes. This is
Fig. 3. F-Measure of all machine learning algorithm over time during training phase.
Fig. 4. Machine activity over time.
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logical as, for instance, when malicious network activity occurs is likely that CPU and RAM use will also spike due to additional
resource being required for the activity. Looking at the results of the MLP model (see Fig. 3d) we see the model is able to better weight
the machine activity and tweet meta-data to control for the lack of machine activity at the start of the interaction. The F-measure rises
smoothly from 1 s, suggesting it is making better use of the Twitter metadata to improve accuracy in the early stages of activity. In
terms highest F-measure achieved, the J48 and MLP models perform best with 0.998 at 10 s. At 3 s the results are almost identical.
The key diﬀerence between models being a slight improvement in MLP at 2 s, but this is countered by the speed at which J48 returns
a result. The MLP result takes longer than a second to be returned, whereas the J48 takes milliseconds. Thus, in practical application,
the J48 model is most likely to be favourable.
4.2. Training model without online social network platform attributes
A lot of research has been done in the past to detect malicious/spam tweets propagating on Twitter based on tweet attributes
(Benevenuto et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2012; Cresci et al., 2015; Grier et al., 2010; Stringhini et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2011). Thus we
included tweet metadata as part of the feature set for prediction in the previous section. However, these features are quite idio-
syncratic and not consistent across diﬀerent OSNs. For instance, if we wanted to predict a drive-by download via other OSNs such as
Facebook, Tumblr or Instagram, we would get a slightly diﬀerent set of user characteristics from the metadata available. Thus, we
aimed to determine the impact of removing these features and using machine activity data alone to determine the applicability of our
method across diﬀerent OSNs. To conduct this experiment we selected the model from the previous experiment that provided us the
best performance - the J48 algorithm that displayed apparent correlation with machine activity. We retrained the model using only
the machine activity - no tweet metadata. Table 2 and Fig. 5 show performance of the model over time.
Fig. 5 shows the F-measure metrics for the J48 model when trained with and without tweet metadata. When we compare the
results of both J48 models we observe that the model built solely on machine activity data ﬂuctuates over time. The model F-measure
drops by around 13% at t=1 s. This suggests that Twitter's idiosyncratic attributes such as number of followers signiﬁcantly con-
tribute to accurate classiﬁcation of malicious URLs but that the model is still highly accurate when using machine activity alone,
making it likely that the approach would work to detect drive-by downloads on other OSNs.
Without the OSN metadata the model seems able to cope with the low rate of activity at the start of the interaction, which is
Table 2
Training model on Euro 2016 log ﬁle using J48 algorithm without Tweet metadata.
Euro 2016 Train Model -J48 (without Tweet metadata)
Time Precision Recall F-Measure
1 0.89 0.863 0.858
2 0.945 0.94 0.939
3 0.909 0.9 0.901
4 0.92 0.904 0.905
5 0.928 0.916 0.915
6 0.914 0.899 0.897
7 0.915 0.899 0.897
8 0.929 0.918 0.918
9 0.941 0.933 0.933
10 0.952 0.947 0.947
Fig. 5. Train J48 model without OSN metadata.
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interesting as this is the opposite of the situation when metadata were used to train the model. The key ﬁnding here is that including
the OSN metadata improves the prediction of the classiﬁer by 12.98%, thus in future our aim will be to try and retain user account
characteristics where possible when applied to OSNs outside of Twitter. Nevertheless, our model still provides a high predictive
performance even without these idiosyncratic data, providing promising results for the application of machine activity models for
predicting malicious behaviour in URLs on multiple OSN platforms.
4.3. Testing using unseen data from Olympics 2016
In the previous two experiments we validated our predictive models using a single dataset from Euro 2016 and obtained pro-
mising results. One possible limitation with this experiment is that cyber attack methods vary over time. For instance, in a second
unrelated event we may see a new collection of individuals spreading malicious URLs, and indeed a diﬀerent behavioural proﬁle
exhibited by the URLs. We therefore now introduce an unseen dataset from the Olympics 2016. This dataset has played no part in
training the model so is completely unseen, testing the generality of the approach to some degree. Given that J48, MLP and Naive
Bayes (NB) models performed best on the Euro 2016 data, we combined these using a Vote meta-classiﬁer. The Vote algorithm allows
two or more machine learning algorithms to be combined in such a way that the label likelihood from each model is used to provide
the classiﬁcation label for each test instance. In our case we used the average probability as the decision point. Through experi-
mentation we narrowed down two combinations of methods that produced the best classiﬁcation performance: J48 & Naive Bayes
and Naive Bayes & MLP. Fig. 6 shows the F-measure for both. The combination of J48 with Naive Bayes reaches an F-measure of 0.85
after just two seconds into the interaction with a Web page. Note again that t=1 is the time the test machine launches the URL so
there is a lag of 1 s, meaning t=3 is actually 2 s after the URL is clicked. The Naive Bayes and MLP combination reaches a maximum
F-measure of 0.75. Thus there is a signiﬁcant performance diﬀerence when combining the Naive Bayes and J48 models. This is
somewhat counter intuitive given the MLP and J48 algorithms were almost indistinguishable at 3 s in the previous experiments, and
that J48 is a rule-based model. We would expect a rule-based model to overﬁt to a single event (i.e. the CPU, RAM and network traﬃc
would have a large variance between events as demonstrated by Burnap et al. (2014)). This was not the case, and in fact this
combination produced a model that is capable of detecting malicious URLs in an unseen dataset with 0.83 F-measure and 15.2% False
Positive rate at only 2 s into the interaction (Table 3).
Fig. 6. Testing on Olympics data using model built earlier.
Table 3
Test model on Olympics 2016 dataset.
Test Olympic- vote algorithm (Naive Bayes and J48)
Interaction time (S) FP rate Precision Recall F-measure
1 0.149 0.836 0.723 0.729
2 0.152 0.861 0.834 0.833
3 0.147 0.867 0.846 0.845
4 0.160 0.856 0.834 0.832
5 0.157 0.881 0.859 0.856
6 0.164 0.884 0.866 0.862
7 0.202 0.860 0.837 0.831
8 0.195 0.855 0.837 0.832
9 0.192 0.854 0.837 0.833
10 0.185 0.855 0.837 0.833
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We next rebuilt the Vote model with and without tweet metadata. Fig. 7 shows the result of the classiﬁer when we tested this
model on the Olympics 2016 (unseen) dataset. We see a signiﬁcant increase (on average an increase of 24% was observed) in F-
measure of the classiﬁer when tweet attributes were added to machine data. This suggests that even though there is a similarity in
tweet attributes across events they are not enough to accurately classify a URL on their own, and we still require machine data to
improve our classiﬁcation across events. Note also that the results of the same models based on tweet metadata alone using the
Olympics 2016 dataset gave an F-measure of only 0.16 (full results not shown for brevity). We can see that while the attack vectors as
measured by system activity are changing between events (hence the drop in performance when we remove the Twitter metadata),
the combination of network characteristics of the individuals posting malicious URLs, and machine activity recorded while inter-
acting with URLs, remain fairly stable - showing a drop in F-measure from 0.977 to 0.833 at 2 s between events. Our model may
therefore not be limited to a single case, but could be applied to multiple events that attract large users on Twitter maintaining
reasonably low error rates when predicting malicious URLs just 2 s into the interaction.
4.4. Adaptive nature of the predictive model
To make our predictive model adaptive, a feed-forward architecture was implemented (see Fig. 2). The rationale was to ensure
that new techniques employed by cybercriminals to carry out a drive-by download attack, as captured in the form of machine
activity, are continually captured and considered while training the model. In order to check the eﬀectiveness of the feed-forward
architecture in achieving this we conducted a further experiment. We trained the model on the Euro 2016 dataset with varying
sample sizes, and tested using 10 fold cross validation. We then tested the model on an unseen dataset (Olympics 2016), with the
hypothesis that increasing the size of a dataset would capture new machine behaviour that would increase the diversity of features
seen by the model and improve the overall F-measure of the predictive model. We used a range of sample sizes for model training -
1%, 5%, 10%, 25%, 50% and 100%. Fig. 8 displays the results of these experiments. We found that training the model with only 1%
of total sample size, using 10 cross fold technique, produced an F-Measure of 0.89. However, when we tested the model on an unseen
dataset we found the F-measure dropped to 0.533. By increasing the size of the training dataset from 1% to 100% in various stages we
aimed to simulate how the model would behave as new data is added to the model over time and the feature diversity increases. We
Fig. 7. Comparison of results on unseen data with and without tweet metadata.
Fig. 8. Comparing classiﬁer accuracy in terms of F-measure when data set is changed.
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observed that the F-measure did indeed increase with increases in dataset size during the training phase as well as with the testing
phase, showing the model to be adaptive when observing more diverse machine behaviour. We saw a signiﬁcant jump in the F-
measure (from 0.54 to 0.80) when the sample size was increased to 10%. However, little change in the F-measure was observed when
we increased the sample size from 25% to 100%, suggesting that 25% of data representing machine activity is enough to build a
model that will give us over 0.83 F-measure and 15% False Positive Rate. After this point more data does not appear to improve
prediction accuracy.
5. Conclusions
As Online Social Networks (OSNs) become a crucial source of information publication and propagation following global events, it
has become an environment that is particularly vulnerable to cyber attack via the injection of shortened URLs that take the user to a
malicious server from which a ’drive-by download’ attack on the local machine is launched.
In this paper, we aimed to build on a body of work that has developed methods to identify malicious URLs in OSNs in an eﬀort to
combat the problem. Existing work has developed methods to provide evidence that OSN accounts or URLs may be malicious, which
can be beneﬁcial, but given the frequency and volume at which new accounts emerge, the only way to determine actual malicious
behaviour is occurring is to observe it. Once malicious activity occurs it was previously not possible to ﬂag it and stop it. None of the
methods published prior to this work allowed us to observe malicious activity and block it to minimise the damage. The main focus of
our research was therefore to develop a method capable of identifying a URL as malicious or benign based on machine activity
metrics generated and logged during interaction with a URL endpoint, and OSN user account attributes (in this case Twitter users)
associated with the URL. Furthermore, the aim was to predict that the URL was likely to be malicious within seconds of opening the
interaction - before the drive-by download attack could complete the execution of its payload. This is the ﬁrst time a method has been
tested to predict a malicious outcome before it takes place - existing literature always classiﬁed URLs using all the data generated
throughout an interaction period - so provided a post-hoc result, or without actually observing the malicious activity - making a
decision based on previously seen behaviour.
We captured tweets containing URLs around two global sporting events. Our system produced a second-by-second time series of
system-level activity (e.g. CPU use, RAM use, network traﬃc etc.) during the visitation of a Web page. We trained the classiﬁcation
model using four diﬀerent types of machine learning algorithm on log ﬁles generated from one event (Euro 2016). The model was
then validated using tweets captured during another event (Olympics 2016). The rationale was to determine if similar machine
activity and tweet attributes were exhibited in two completely diﬀerent events (i.e. does the model generalise beyond a single event).
A ten-fold cross-validation was performed to train the model, and an F-measure of 0.99 was achieved by using the log ﬁles generated
at 1 s into the interaction with a Web server. One of the interesting observations during the training phase was that by using tweet
attributes we can increase the accuracy by 12.98% during training and around 24% during testing phase when compared to machine
activity alone, demonstrating that the Twitter metadata exhibited by cybercriminals carrying out drive-by download at425 tacks
were relatively stable, while the URL behaviour changed. When tested using an unseen dataset (Olympics 2016) we achieved an F-
measure of 0.833 from log ﬁles generated at 2 s - that is 1 s after launching the URL. The highest F-measure achieved on the unseen
event was 0.862 at 5 s from the time the URL was launched. Our model may therefore not be limited to a single case but could be
applied to multiple events on Twitter maintaining reasonably low error rates when predicting malicious URLs just 1 s into the
interaction. The model allows us to reduce the detection time of a malicious URL from minutes - the time taken to run the URL in a
secure sandbox environment - to 5 s, with F-measure of 0.86 on an unseen dataset. Furthermore, it allows us to stop the execution
process with 0.833 F-measure just 1 s after clicking the URL, preventing the full execution of the malicious payload, rather than
detecting the malicious action retrospectively and having to repair the system. Future work includes increasing the granularity
further by creating log ﬁles at shorter intervals to determine if we can detect malicious URLs even earlier in the execution cycle, to
avoid the key limitation which is that a cybercriminal can evade detection if the connection is dropped within one second. We have
used two diﬀerent sporting events in this paper because of their reported popularity and therefore attractiveness as a target event.
Other types of events could be included in future. From a real-world scenario, it could be possible that our proposed predictive system
could be implemented to monitor tweets around ongoing events that generate large volumes of traﬃc to identify malicious Web
servers and 445 remove them before users can click on links that interact with them.
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